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Case Report j
Understanding Implementation: The Case of a Computerized
Physician Order Entry System in a Large Dutch University
Medical Center
JOS AARTS, MSC, HANS DOOREWAARD, PHD, MARC BERG, MA, MD, PHD
A b s t r a c t Most studies of the impact of information systems in organizations tend to see the implementation
process as a ‘‘rollout’’ of technology, as a technical matter removed from organizational dynamics. There is substantial
agreement that the success of implementing information systems is determined by organizational factors. However, it is
less clear what these factors are. The authors propose to characterize the introduction of an information system as
a process of mutual shaping. As a result, both the technology and the practice supported by the technology are
transformed, and specific technical and social outcomes gradually emerge. The authors suggest that insights from social
studies of science and technology can help to understand an implementation process. Focusing on three theoretical
aspects, the authors argue first that the implementation process should be understood as a thoroughly social process in
which both technology and practice are transformed. Second, following Orlikowski’s concept of ‘‘emergent change,’’
they suggest that implementing a system is, by its very nature, unpredictable. Third, they argue that success and failure
are not dichotomous and static categories, but socially negotiated judgments. Using these insights, the authors have
analyzed the implementation of a computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system in a large Dutch university
medical center. During the course of this study, the full implementation of CPOE was halted, but the aborted
implementation exposed issues on which the authors did not initially focus.
j J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2004;11:207–216. DOI 10.1197/jamia.M1372.
In the traditional system life cycle approach, implementation
is seen as a clearly defined phase that comes after the
initiation and development phase of a system and before
a system is put into actual use. Each phase has clearly defined
inputs and outputs, and therefore documentation and
signoffs are crucial elements of the life cycle. The phase of
implementation encompasses such activities as training,
conversion, acceptance testing, and a postimplementation
audit.1 In this view, implementation is understood as
a ‘‘rollout’’ in which technology is far removed from its
organizational dynamics.
Few studies have been devoted to understanding the actual
processes of implementation of information systems in health
care, mainly because such studies require access to hospital
sites and the following of an implementation over a longer
period. Yet it is now generally accepted that the traditional
system life cycle is not adequate to understand the process of
implementation of information systems.1 Different authors
inside and outside medical informatics have sought to
improve on this understanding, and to get a better grasp on
the intertwinement of technology and the organization. Kling
and Scacchi have proposed the ‘‘web of computing’’ in which
the use of an information system is understood in terms of the
larger social and technical context in which the information
system is embedded.2 Medical informatics scholars have
sought to understand how information systems are diffused
in organizations and the barriers to such processes. Lorenzi
and Riley, for example, examined the role of leadership and
change management skills to introduce new technologies.3 In
a fictitious case presentation of the introduction of a comput-
erized physician order entry (CPOE) system, Ash et al. sought
to identify different stakeholders and how their opinions and
behavior might influence the adoption of new technology.4
We describe findings from a longitudinal study of the
implementation of a CPOE system in a large Dutch academic
medical center. We were in close contact with this center
between 1998 and January 2003. During this time, we
collected data through semistructured interviews, ob-
servations of staff meetings, and document analysis. Also,
we constructed an in-depth overview of events before 1998
through interviews and document analysis. We use this
material to further enhance the emerging understanding of
the implementation process. We draw on theoretical insights
from recent social studies of science and technology.5
Contrary to more traditional views, we propose that
implementation encompasses the trajectory of introducing
Affiliations of the authors: Institute of Health Policy and Manage-
ment, Erasmus University Medical Center, Rotterdam, The Nether-
lands (JA, MB); Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud
University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands (HD).
The authors acknowledge the staff of the university medical center
for sharing their experiences with them. The first author acknowl-
edges the Fontys Hogescholen in Eindhoven for a research grant in
the initial phase of this study. The authors thank the anonymous
reviewers for their comments to improve the paper.
Correspondence and reprints: Jos Aarts, MSc, Institute of Health
Policy and Management, Erasmus University Medical Center, P.O.
Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e-mail:
<j.aarts@bmg.eur.nl>.
Received for publication: 03/27/03; accepted for publication:
11/24/03.
207Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association Volume 11 Number 3 May / Jun 2004
an information system from the very first idea that such
a system is needed to address perceived organizational
problems to the dynamics of use in work practices.6
The purpose of this study is to examine the three theoretical
aspects to understand the implementation process. First, we
elaborate the claim that to understand ‘‘implementation,’’ one
needs to focus on the interrelation of the organizational
environment and the technology. Kling and Scacchi argue that
the social context determines to a large extent how a new
technology will be adopted and used by an organization.2
They reject the idea that ‘‘inherent’’ characteristics of
a technology will determine specific effects in the organiza-
tion, for example, that increasing the speed of data flows will
lead to faster and better decisions. Intent on showing the
importance of social context, however, they also tend to
underscore the importance of the system’s technical proper-
ties. Just how an organization will react to an information
system, after all, is importantly influenced (not determined,
indeed) by the characteristics of that system. As one of us has
phrased it, the introduction of information systems in health
care practices is a thoroughly social process in which both the
technology and the practice are transformed.5 We have
labeled this perspective the sociotechnical approach.7 The term
derives from the field of social studies of science and
technology, in which researchers aim to understand how
technology is shaped as part of ‘‘messy’’ networks that
combine technical, social, and economic elements.5
The second aspect is the concept of emergent change and the
notion of an unpredictable outcome of an implementation
process. In the classic system life cycle, each phase forms the
input to the next phase. This implies that the introduction of
information systems is a linear process with predictable
outcomes in the form of deliverables. We argue, however, that
implementation processes are typified by contingencies and
proceed in a far from linear manner. They are part and parcel
of organizational dynamics that, as a result of the complexity
of the organizations of which we speak, cannot be foreseen,
let alone be predicted.8 In addition, the broader context in
which these organizations find themselves is in a constant
flux. Demographic changes, political pressure, increasing
demands for quality care, and new medical technologies alter
the conditions in which health care is delivered. Following
Orlikowski, we use the concept of ‘‘emergent change’’ to get
a grasp on the development of information systems in such
circumstances.9 This process of ‘‘change’’ never stops; even
when the implementation is ‘‘formally’’ finished, users will
Table 1 j List of Interviewed Persons*
Interview No. Interviewed Person When Topics of Interview
1 Project leader 1 Jan 1999 Goal and setup of CPOE implementation project
2 Project coordinator medical applications Jan 1999 Goal and setup of CPOE implementation project,
envisaged nature of CPOE implementations
3 Project coordinator education and training Feb 1999 Education and training issues of CPOE system
implementation, development of customized
user manuals
4 Medical records coordinator clinical surgery and
system implementation specialist
Mar 1999 Goal and setup of CPOE system implementation
project, setup and expected outcomes of
pathology–gynecology pilot project
5 Project leader 2 Mar 1999 Goal of CPOE in medical center, setup of pilot
project, collaboration with various clinical
departments
6 Chief gynecologist ambulatory clinic Mar 1999 Goal of CPOE pilot, planning of the pilot project,
nature, workflow of pathology order,
expectations about CPOE and expected
outcomes of the pilot project
7 Chief pathologist Apr 1999 Expectations of CPOE and pilot, workflow issues
in pathology
8 Pathology technician Apr 1999 Workflow issues of pathology, experience with
pilot setup
9 IT administrator department of pathology May 1999 Setup of pathology pilot, general issues of
experience with CPOE system
implementation since beginning of project
10 IT administrator department of pathology May 1999 Clarifications of issues raised in first interview with
respect to implementation of the CPOE system
11 Medical records coordinator clinical surgery and
system implementation specialist
Jun 1999 Review of pilot project and evaluation of CPOE
system implementation project
12 Project coordinator CPOE system Jul 1999 Evaluation of CPOE system implementation
13 Project leader 1 Jan 2000 Review of aborted implementation and
goals of CPOE
14 Project leader 2 Jan 2000 Review of aborted implementation
15 Project coordinator medical applications Feb 2000 Review of aborted implementation
*Three interviews were held prior to the implementation pilot project and the issues addressed pertained to the goals of the computerized
physician order entry (CPOE) system implementation and the setup of the pilots. The interviews in 1999 addressed the CPOE pilot gynecology–
pathology, but general issues were raised as well. The interviews in 2000 were conducted after the presentation of the external evaluation results.
The first author remained in contact with the project leader and project coordinator medical applications after 2000.
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still shape and craft the information system to fit their
particular requirements or interests, often in a way un-
anticipated by the designers.10
The third aspect is the concept of fit and the notion that
success and failure are not dichotomous and static categories.
Rather, ‘‘success’’ and ‘‘failure’’ are socially negotiated judgments,
which may vary depending on the moment in the im-
plementation process and the perspective of the stakeholder
focused on. In addition, the ‘‘success’’ or ‘‘failure’’ of an
information system lies exactly in the interaction between the
system’s functioning and the organization’s needs and
working patterns.11 Lorenzi and Riley wrote that a ‘‘techni-
cally best’’ system can be brought to its knees by people who
do not feel ownership and resist implementation, whereas
a ‘‘technically mediocre’’ system may be extremely valued by
its users.12 Often, even apparently clearcut technical
shortcomings can be the result of poorly managed de-
velopment processes.11 We explore how the concept of ‘‘fit’’
can give meaning to successful implementation of an
information system.13 Southon et al. introduced the concept
of fit in health informatics to emphasize the importance of the
organizational configuration in managing the transfer and
diffusion of technology, specifically organizational strategy,
structure, management processes, roles, and skills.14 Our
focus is on the necessity of actively producing fit between
work processes and information technology.
Research Methodology
Qualitative research methods are very appropriate to study
systems in organizational contexts. Information systems in
organizations are complex technologic artifacts because they
are shaped by time and continuous change.15 From 1998, the
first author conducted semistructured interviews, attended
meetings, and studied documents about the selection,
specification, and implementation of the information system,
and the evaluation of the CPOE pilots.
The interviewed persons included the two project leaders, the
medical and technical coordinators of the implementation
team of the CPOE system, and the members of the pilot
project that tested the feasibility of order entry in gynecology
and pathology. In total, ten persons were interviewed and 15
interviews were conducted (see Table 1). Apart from the staff
gynecologist and head of pathology, all interviewed persons
had various roles during the course of the implementation.
Therefore, they could provide us with a unique insight about
the full history of the introduction of the system. The
interviews lasted between one and two hours. Ongoing
contacts have been maintained with a few members of the
now-dissolved implementation team who are still active in
informatics projects of the medical center. In addition, we
observed and took notes of all staff meetings of the pilot
project that we followed. We observed the use of the system
during the pilot project and occasionally asked the users what
they were doing. In the staff meetings, we focused on how the
participants were behaving and what they were saying.
Finally, we also observed and took notes of the meetings in
whichtheconclusionsof the consultancyfirmaboutabortingthe
implementation were presented. The documents pertaining to
this advice and the decision making about the cessation of the
implementation were also made available to us.
Notes, interviews, and implementation documents were
coded for occurrence of specific key words, but generally
the documents available to us were structured so that
patterns could be extracted.
Permission to study the documents, interview persons, and
attend meetings was obtained from the steering committee of
the CPOE system implementation project. The use of patient
data was not envisaged and did not take place. Therefore, we
did not seek approval of the medical ethics committee of the
medical center.
The Case of the Implementation of an Order Entry
and Results Reporting System
History of the Implementation
Contrary to the practices of other Dutch university medical
centers, a large 953-bed university medical center in the east
of the country has always developed its own information
systems. In 1988, the hospital concluded that its hospital
information system was becoming obsolete and decided that
it would rather buy an off-the-shelf product than build a new
one again (see Figure 1 for implementation timeline). As a key
feature, the new system would have to be focused on the core
business of the hospital: supporting clinical work (rather than
only clerical work). A small group of senior staff from the
nursing, medicine, clinical laboratories, and information
systems departments, the initiators, set out to identify the
needs of the hospital and scout for information systems
available, especially in the United States.
The computing infrastructure of the medical center consisted
of two IBM mainframe computers under the operating
system MVS/XA and the network protocol SNA through
which a host of other systems and terminals were connected.
On one mainframe resided the information systems in use;
the other was used for backup, and development and testing
purposes. The medical center had been using IBM systems
since the late 1960s.
The university hospital clinical registration system (UZIS)
was homegrown, whereas the financial, clerical, and person-
nel software packages were commercially acquired. UZIS
allowed for requesting diagnostic and therapeutic treatments,
F i g u r e 1. Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system implementation timeline. The timeline indicates key events
during the implementation of the system.
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registering diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, and
ordering laboratory tests. In a way, it was a very primitive
order entry system.
The existing computing infrastructure and cost con-
siderations constrained the choice of a new information
system. An internal report of 1990 described three systems
available for the Dutch market, of which the TDS7000 system
of the TDS Healthcare Systems Corporation* was favored.
The medical center had always built its own clinical
registration system on the existing IBM mainframe in-
frastructure. It therefore maintained a large development
and support group of approximately 100 staff. Yet the center
felt that building and maintaining a complete clinical system
on its own would be a risky (and potentially very expensive)
strategy. Also, changing the technical infrastructure would be
costly. The acquisition of the hospital information system that
was used by all other university medical centers in The
Netherlands and that ran on a different platform was
therefore never seriously considered.
The medical center wanted to move toward more clinically
oriented systems. All three systems under consideration
supported order entry and results reporting. The decision to
move toward the TDS7000 system was motivated by site
visits in the United States, convincing the participants
(including key future users) that the system was the best
choice: it had advanced functionalities, its configuration was
highly flexible, and it would be feasible to connect to systems
already in use because of the network and data communica-
tion protocols. With this system, the medical center thought it
would become the leading center in patient care information
technology, moving far beyond the other university medical
centers in the country.
In July 1993, the group proposed to purchase the system,
which was primarily a computerized order entry and results
reporting system for physicians. The system had been
developed in the late 1960s and was the first system
specifically designed to have the work of health care
professionals as its core orientation rather than being oriented
to the support of clerical and financial activities.16 The
advantages listed were less paperwork, more complete
orders, fewer transcription errors, and faster availability of
results. Indeed, later studies showed that CPOE reduces
medication errors and improves patient outcomes.17 It was
expected that reductions of clerical staff could be achieved
because of the reduction in paperwork and a more efficient
user interface. However, the hospital community was assured
that the nature of their work would not seriously change and
that there would be no job redundancies. In 1995, after
a number of site visits (in the United States and the United
Kingdom) and in-house consultations of medical and nursing
staff and representatives of the employees, the board of
directors signed a contract with the vendor to deliver the
system and the accompanying support and implementation
procedures. The decision was made to implement and
activate the registration functionality first so that UZIS could
be phased out as soon as possible and to implement the CPOE
functionality after a limited number of pilots. Between 1995
and 1997, work focused on the configuration of the system
and training the trainers. Training of all prospective clerical
users, including the superusers, started approximately six
months before the system became operational. Computer-
based training facilities were made available for classroom
and individual ‘‘walk-in’’ training. Each prospective user had
to pass a computer-based examination before he or she would
be issued a password and authorized to use the system.
Freeing time for training and education proved to be difficult
for busy clerks and caused an extension of the originally
planned training period that was to end in the summer of
1997. The hospital community was informed about the
progress of implementation through articles in the hospital
newsmagazine and special newsletters. These articles were of
a human-interest nature because they focused primarily on
the personal experiences of individuals in the project. The
newsletters carried more factual information such as
descriptions of the system and its parts, the implementation
plan, the progress, training, and software releases.
The system went live on December 1, 1997. At that moment,
only the clerical functions of patient admission, medical
procedures registration, and patient scheduling became active
hospital-wide. During 1998 and 1999, many corrections and
improvements were made to meet the needs of the users and
counter serious problems (discussed later in this article). The
year 1999 also saw the start of the next phase of the
introduction of order entry and results reporting functionality.
A few small-scale pilots were conducted to assess the effects
and feasibility of fully implementing this functionality. Yet, as
we shall see in more detail later, from the summer of 1999,
physician resistance against the CPOE system built up
significantly. The board of the specialist staff (medisch
stafconventy) requested an external review of the system. In
October 1999, the hospital board hired a consultancy firm to
review the system and the project management structure and
to make recommendations for the continuation of the project.
In February 2000, the consultancy firm advised the board to
discontinue the implementation of the system, which was
graphically depicted as a Trabantz car with square wheels (see
below). In December 2000, the board decided to freeze further
deployment of the system and not to implement CPOE. It
would allow system modifications only to maintain current
functionality for the hospital, minimizing the damage until
a new system would be selected and implemented.
The Project Team
A project team was responsible for the implementation of the
system (see Figure 2). This team reported to a steering group,
*Eclipsys Corporation has acquired TDS Healthcare Systems
Corporation. The TDS7000 hospital information system is now
known as the E7000 system. Eclipsys ceased selling the system in
1996 and is now developing its successor, ‘‘Sunrise.’’ The authors
emphasize that the system is taken as an example to address
implementation issues, none of which are intended to be portrayed
as product-specific. We therefore use the term ‘‘CPOE system,’’ or
simply ‘‘the system.’’
yThe ‘‘medisch stafconvent’’ is the formal gathering of all tenured
medical staff of a Dutch university hospital. The stafconvent advises
the hospital board in all matters medical. Some decisions cannot be
made without its consent. The board is elected by the membership.
zTrabant was a car of East German make that was proverbial for the
fully outdated technology of the then communist government.
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which consisted of key individuals representing the medical
departments and the hospital board. The steering group
made major decisions about the implementation process,
including involvement of clinical departments and the
allocation of funding. A medical specialist headed the project
team. His main tasks were to manage the project and to
ensure the ties with the medical professionals and other
stakeholders within the hospital. His position was part-time
to allow him to continue his medical practice. A project
coordinator, a senior staff member of the information
technology department, was responsible for the day-to-day
management of the project team and all matters technical.
The other members of the team came from the information
technology department. The latter focused primarily on
‘‘technical’’ issues such the development of specifications,
designing databases, creating a technical infrastructure,
designing screens, and educating future users. Each mem-
ber also addressed a specific domain of applications of
the system. Each main domain—medicine, nursing labo-
ratory, radiology, pharmacy, patient registration, and
scheduling—had its own task force consisting of members
of clinical departments and technical staff. These task forces
decided on the way the system would be used and which
functionalities would be implemented within their domains.
In the beginning, the local project team was mirrored by
a team of the vendors as part of their implementation
procedures. This was later abandoned because the im-
plementation took more time and effort then expected, and
the costs were becoming prohibitive for the hospital.
According to the same procedures, key contact persons were
appointed at all clinical, ambulatory clinical, and ancillary
departments. The original list numbered close to 150 names.
The key contact people were usually physicians, nurses,
clerical personnel, or technicians who were supposed to be
familiar with work procedures in their departments.
However, this approach was also abandoned because the
number of people involved was too large to manage properly,
and it proved to be difficult for these contact people to
produce useful information and specifications for the
implementation staff. The project team relied mostly on the
expertise of the members of the different task forces.
Computerized Physician Order Entry
The core functionality of the system was CPOE, around
which the future development of the electronic patient record
would be shaped. Our study focused initially on this point.
The implementers expected that all physicians would use this
application. The people involved in the gynecology–pathol-
ogy CPOE pilot held the same view. Writing orders, after all,
was the professional responsibility of the physician and was
not to be delegated to nurses or clerks. User codes,
passwords, and electronic authentication would ensure that
only physicians could enter orders and that any misuse of the
system could be detected through log-on trails. However, this
core functionality was never implemented organization-wide
and could not be studied in full.
F i g u r e 2. The structure of the computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system implementation team. The coordinators of
each task force and the project leader formed the implementation team. The project leader was a physician who spent about half
the time on the project and was for the other part still active in medicine. The project coordinator, a senior member of the
information technology department, was responsible for all technical issues of the implementation and coordinated the members
of the implementation team on a day-to-day basis. Each task force was responsible for a particular application domain. The task
force ‘‘function departments’’ encompass departments such as radiology, nuclear medicine, pathology, and vascular ultrasound
imaging. The task force for pharmacy applications was planned to become active in a later stage. The director of information
technology was a member of the Steering Group.
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Analysis
The Sociotechnical Reality: The Intertwinement of
Organizational Environment and Technology
Existing technologies and organizational arrangements are
important factors that determine the introduction of new
technologies such as the introduction of CPOE. In the case of
the university medical center, the organizational con-
siderations that determined the choice of the system could
be summarized as follows.
 The existing IBM technologic infrastructure narrowed the
choice. The technology itself did not dictate the choice, but
the associated organizational arrangements did. For in-
stance, a large body of information technology staff over
a long period had gained expertise to develop and support
the IBM infrastructure, including the mainframes and the
network. It was simply too costly to retrain them for a new
computing infrastructure or to replace them.
 Another factor was the fact that investments had been
made in nonclinical IBM mainframe applications such as
personnel and billing systems that had to be connected to
the new clinical application. Again, it would be a de-
struction of capital investments and human resources if
these systems had to be replaced.
The system had of course to be adapted to the Dutch
situation. The most visible adaptation was the translation of
the screens into Dutch. However, the more subtle part was the
translation of the clerical workflows into pathways within the
system. This led to an explosion of the number of screens to
reduce the rigidity of the implied workflow. Sometimes this
adaptation was difficult to achieve. The system was
conceived to be used within the American hospital system,
which is primarily oriented to its inpatient functions. The
CPOE implementation in El Camino Hospital is a good
example of that approach.18 It proved to be more difficult to
adapt the system to the Dutch situation, where medical
specialist diagnostic assessment and therapy take place in
ambulatory settings (polikliniek, ambulatory clinical depart-
ment or ambulatory clinic). The ambulatory clinics process
a high number of patients per day and form an integral part of
the medical center (see Table 2). With a referral letter from his
or her family physician, a patient usually sees a medical
specialist first in the ambulatory clinic. The medical specialist
may then decide to admit the patient clinically or continue
treatment in an ambulatory mode. Also, after a clinical
discharge, a medical specialist would see the patient in the
ambulatory clinic for follow-up treatments or checkups. We
examine the consequences of that later in this article.
The screens of the CPOE system were translated into Dutch as
Figure 3 shows. The mainframe screens were emulated in
a Microsoft Windows environment. Data could be entered
with the keyboard or with the help of a mouse and clicking on
selected fields on the screen, a key characteristic of the system.
The mouse movements were very coarse. The interface was
originally conceived for terminal interaction with a light pen.
For adequate user interaction, the screen could hold
maximally 24 3 40 characters.
The implementers of the system assumed that the introduc-
tion would not significantly affect the organization for two
reasons. First, the introduction of CPOE would build on
a functionality that already was agreed on in 1983 and that
was, although very limited and primitively, implemented in
UZIS. The functionality was expected to remain basically the
same. Second, the existing IBM infrastructure would remain
familiar to most information technology staff, whereas the
Windows emulation would make use easier. The im-
plementation focused at first on translating the clerical
procedures of UZIS into the new system. In a later stage,
the functionality of real-time physician order entry and
results reporting would be added.
In reality, the implementation had a drastic impact on the
organization. Soon after the implementation, clerical users
found that retrieving and entering patient data took much
more time because each screen would allow them to handle
only a limited amount of data. For most tasks, many more
screens now had to be worked through. Also, when making
typing errors, they had to go back in the pathway and redo
a part of the transaction or even the whole transaction.
Table 2 j Key Figures of the University Medical Center
for the Year 2002*
Ambulatory clinical department visits 381,011
Clinical admissions 24.494
One-day therapeutic treatments 15,410
Bed occupancy rate 60%
Beds 953
Staff 8,153
Full-time equivalents 5,548
*Ambulatory clinical departments are an intrinsic part of the Dutch
hospital system and are linked to the equivalent clinical depart-
ments. Staff physicians and residents see their patients at both places.
In the Dutch system patients need to be referred by their family
physician to see a medical specialist. A medical specialist will usually
see the patient first in the ambulatory clinic and then decide what
further action will be needed, including a clinical admission.
Therefore, ambulatory clinical departments process a high number
of patients. The number of single-day treatments is significant
compared with the number of clinical admissions. The high number
of staff is indicative of the high load of training requirements.
F i g u r e 3. Dutch translation of the TDS7000 system screen.
This menu screen allows doctors to see standing orders and
patient data. Under the heading ‘‘Patientgegevens’’ (patient
data), the last arrow is a reference to the DRG-like
classification scheme (DBCs) that became mandatory in
Dutch hospitals as of January 1, 2004. Note the coarseness
of the system emulation compared with the finesse of the
Windows environment (see Windows task bar).
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Furthermore, they discovered that data they held to be
essential vanished after a few screens. In the old system, some
data such as the patient ID number remained in view to help
navigation through the system.
All this caused a severe slow-down of work processes, which
created chaos at the ambulatory clinical department desks:
long lines of (often angry) patients waiting to be helped,
frustrated physicians, and verbally assaulted secretaries: ‘‘Are
you so stupid that you can’t handle a computer?’’ [Patient,
ambulatory clinic]
The problem could only be remedied by increasing the
clerical staffing of the ambulatory clinical departments to
handle the patient load. This was quite contrary to the
expectation that the introduction of the new system would
save on personnel, as was projected in the proposal.
The problems that the users encountered with the system
showed that the registration work processes were closely
interrelated with UZIS, the old system. The screen of that
system always held the patient number on the top line. The
users were very proficient with use of command and function
keys to interact with the system. A telling example was the
following. The laboratory system could not be connected to
the system after the ‘‘big bang.’’ UZIS remained functional to
allow users to see the data of the laboratory information
system. Users of the system also accessed UZIS at a terminal
next to the personal computer (PC) and used the patient name
and number, visible on that system, to navigate through their
own.
The recurrent problems also changed the attitude of those
physicians who were at first champions of the system. When
they saw that the workload of the clerks had increased and
were confronted with the practical consequences of the
system in use, they turned into opponents of the system.
They started to emphasize that it was not their task or interest
to spend so much time behind a computer: ‘‘The system
requires a doctor to send electronic notes. Doctors don’t send
notes. They have other people doing that for them.’’
[Physician, former project leader, CPOE implementation]
Weiner et al. reported a similar response of physicians toward
CPOE.19 In economic terms, CPOE envisages the most highly
trained professionals with the greatest opportunity costs to be
placed in the data entry role.20 Given the legal distribution of
responsibilities, and the expectation that work procedures
would be streamlined, the designers in the medical center had
embraced this principle. The professionals, however, now
started to rally against this idea because it was clear to them
that the system would cost them time. What was much less
clear to them was what benefit it would bring and how it
would fit into their work practices.
Another problem occurred at departments where patients
underwent diagnostic or therapeutic treatments. The
budgeting of these departments depended on the number
of patients treated. When, after some months, the figures
requested from the information systems department turned
out to be wrong, it took a few months to find the cause. This
endangered their proper enumeration, which caused uproar
among the medical specialists involved. (In fact, it turned out
that the main problems were due primarily to poor
instructions on how to enter patient information correctly
into the system.) Other small issues further hurt the
acceptance of the system, such as a problem with clinical
trial patients who erroneously received bills for their
experimental treatments.
Our findings emphasize the intertwinement of organizational
and technical elements in information technology. The
combination of technical considerations (the preexisting
IBM infrastructure) and organizational considerations such
as ‘‘cost containment,’’ ‘‘being clinically oriented,’’ and ‘‘being
a leading medical center’’ together led to the choice for the
CPOE system. The system, subsequently, was translated into
Dutch and tinkered with to be able to support the typical
Dutch ‘‘ambulatory clinic’’ emphasis in hospital work. When
put to work in actual practice, the technical features of the
system felt restrictive and cumbersome to the users,
especially when more and more people had become adjusted
to graphic user interfaces. This restrictive and cumbersome
‘‘feel,’’ however, was not just a technologic issue; the screens
could have been configured differently (e.g., more easy to use
in admitting a patient), but they were not. Also, organiza-
tional routines could have been altered to fit the system better,
but that was also not tried. Finally, the choice to have the
physician in the data entry role was not a technologic
necessity; it was an organizational, largely unquestioned,
implementation choice.
Understanding the implementation of an information tech-
nology, therefore, requires a simultaneous orientation toward
both social and technical aspects. Likewise, the account
illustrates how it is useless to attempt to determine whether
the experienced problems were ultimately ‘‘technical’’ or
‘‘human.’’ Technical design finds its roots in the organiza-
tional conditions and arrangements and organizational
conditions are changed as a result of technical design, as the
example of the clerical users demonstrates.
The Unpredictable Outcome of Implementation
Processes: Emergent Change
In 1999, a few pilots were conducted to assess the feasibility of
the order entry and results reporting functionality of the
system. The main objectives of the pilots were to understand
how and which work practices would be influenced by the
system, to identify program errors, and to establish
the conditions and to plan for a hospital-wide rollout. The
conditions were classified in three categories, which were
the description of work processes and possible adaptation of
the system’s functionality, the technical infrastructure, and
the level of support and training for users. It was thought that
if the conditions in these categories were judged to be
adequately met, then the order entry functionality could be
activated.
The departments of the hospital were selected according to
a judgment about how well work processes were formalized.
The department of radiology and nuclear medicine and the
department of pathology were considered good candidates
for starting pilots because both departments were thought to
have well-formalized work routines that would require little
adaptation. The clinical department and ambulatory clinical
departments were selected through the informal network of
the project leader and other team members and at the
suggestions of the radiology and pathology departments.
There was little preplanning of the pilots. For example, it was
agreed that physician order entry would be implemented as
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a pilot between the departments of gynecology and
pathology because during examinations, physicians would
usually take tissue specimens and send them to pathology.
The number of orders was expected to be sufficient to make
a valid assessment of the feasibility of order entry. A plan
was made detailing who would be involved in the project.
Only a few days before the start of the pilot, the technical
staff discovered that the expected refurbishment of the
operating theater was canceled and that it was impossible to
install a PC because the whole theater would have to be
rewired to comply with electrical safety regulations. The
pilot then moved to the ambulatory gynecology clinical
department and only one doctor was involved. A PC was
activated close to the nursing station and a printer was
installed for printing labels. Actually, the participants,
including the pathologists, the pathology technicians, and
the attending gynecologist and nurses, evaluated the out-
comes of this pilot very positively.
The connection of the CPOE system with the laboratory
information systems of the hospital was considered crucial
for laboratory ordering. As in most modern hospital
laboratories, the processing of samples and analysis and
collection of data are, to a large extent, automated. The
selection of a new laboratory information system in the
department of clinical chemistry turned out to be very
problematic and was only resolved well after the decision to
abort CPOE implementation. No connection was made with
the new system, and UZIS was still used to see the data on the
old laboratory system. The selection process was not a re-
sponsibility of the implementation team; it belonged to the
laboratory staff who did not want to be involved with the
project because they thought that they already had enough
problems of their own. It crucially affected the planned
implementation.
The examples of the selection process of the pilots and the
laboratory information system show that implementation
was fraught with uncertainty because it was dependent on
the willingness of individuals and departments to participate
and on the local contingencies. In a hospital, there is no
central line of command that can align departments and
projects. The process contributed to the overall unpredict-
ability of the outcomes of the pilots.
Time influenced the implementation process. Because several
years passed after the decision to implement a new system,
users got acquainted with Windows-based PCs. The interface
became ‘‘stone age’’ in appearance: ‘‘The characters look like
Braille.’’ [Nurse, dermatology clinic]
Especially due to the pressure from the physicians, the board
of directors started to shift their position with regard to the
CPOE system. The board did not move toward ‘‘owning’’ the
system, but looked for arguments to halt the implementation.
Finally, by having an external review, they effectively blamed
factors outside of their influence such as the aged character of
the system in the context of rapidly developing Windows-
based PC systems.
The end result was a ‘‘lock-in’’ situation. The full-blown
implementation of the system was aborted, but the system
was not put out of use. Nobody was happy with the system,
but, on the other hand, it was clear that for the time being, no
alternative was available. The system is still in use as a patient
registration system, and in due time will be replaced by a new
system. Work is now focused on the development of graphic
workstations that allow health care professionals to see
patient data in a clinically meaningful way.
Designers and implementers devote much effort to control-
ling the implementation process. Pilots in this perspective are
meant to identify shortcomings of the system that can be
remedied before a full-blown implementation. The scaling
down of the gynecology pilot was not anticipated, as it was
the result of contingencies that they could not know. The
implementation team did also not realize when the pilots
became futile. They did not recognize how adverse ex-
periences with the patient registration portion of the system
had negatively affected a major stakeholder group. In the
dynamics of implementing the system, the previously
mentioned changes were not anticipated and certainly not
planned for. Planning occurred as a response to new arising
situations, as the gynecology–pathology pilot showed. The
focus on systems implementation as a technical strategy
allowed different stakeholders to develop their own agenda,
as circumstances would dictate. Changes only emerged as
a coming together of contingent events and decisions made
on an ad hoc basis. As Orlikowski puts it: ‘‘emergent change
is the realization of a new pattern of organizing in the absence
of explicit, a priori intentions.’’9 Therefore, we would
characterize the implementation of an information system
in a complex organization as ‘‘emergent change.’’
‘‘Success’’ or ‘‘Failure’’: Producing ‘‘Fit’’
The implementation of an information system in clinical
practice is not a linear process with a defined starting point,
clearly delineated goals, and readily identifiable stages. By
most accounts, the implementation of the system was a failure
(although the system is still in place). Looking back, the
functionality of order entry and results reporting, which
constituted the core of the system, was never activated.
However, it would be too simplistic to argue that this failure
could have been predicted at the beginning of the project.
Similarly, it would be too simplistic to say that a checklist
with critical success and failure factors could have prevented
the problems. The outcome was rather the result of a series of
events and contingencies that were not planned for or whose
impact was not anticipated. Decisions that looked reasonable
when made can thus become constraining and clearly
‘‘wrong’’ in retrospect. Each step in the process of im-
plementation leads to new and partially unpredictable
outcomes that have to be judged in the context of the new
situation. In the checklist, the box ‘‘appropriate technology’’
would have been ticked at the time the procurement decision
was made; the mainframe technology appeared to be highly
problematic only later. At the time of the decision, the choice
for the IBM mainframe environment made perfect sense;
infrastructures based on PC technology for large
organizations were far from mature up to the middle of the
1990s. One may conclude that long lead times for im-
plementation are questionable because objectives, goals,
and context (organizational and technical) can change
drastically over time, yet it is hard to imagine how such
expensive and complex implementation processes could
reduce their lead time sufficiently. In complex organizations,
large-scale implementations are observed to take a long time.
Such long times are even deemed to be necessary for the
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mutual learning process to develop and implement in-
formation systems.20,21
There is, then, no simple formula for success or failure. The
complexity of the sociotechnical networks, and the inherent
unpredictability of information system implementation
within complex organizations, is simply too great.11 In
addition, what counts as success or failure is not clearcut,
but the outcome of a social negotiation. Many different
definitions of ‘‘success’’ or ‘‘failure’’ can and are used by the
involved actors.11 In this case study, the proposal to introduce
the CPOE system very much focused on savings. Savings
could be found in fewer budgets spent on system de-
velopment and maintenance and reducing the number of
clerical staff. The benefits of medical order entry and results
reporting were phrased in technical terms of better readable
and more complete orders, but the consequences for medical
work were not highlighted. Some studies and reports in the
public press have shown that cost benefits of strategic
information technology in health care and the services
industry in general were not achieved.22 In the discussion
about medication errors, physicians do not see themselves as
part of the problem.23 Other professionals in the loop of
ordering medication often correct potential errors so that the
ordering physician is not confronted with the potential
negative outcome of his or her action.24 In a survey of
hospitals that have implemented order entry and results
reporting systems, Ash et al. found that physicians were
using the system in only 15% of these hospitals.25 The remark
of one of the leading physicians in the CPOE system
implementation project that physicians do not send electronic
notes is a telling example.
From the case study, it became apparent that the system did
not fit well with registration work practices. In a study about
evaluation of medical informatics applications, Kaplan made
a plea to use evaluation methodologies based on social
interactionist theories.26 In this paper, she suggested that ‘‘fit’’
is a key factor for the successful implementation of in-
formation systems in health care. ‘‘Fit’’ has various
dimensions such as compatibility of the system with the
workflow, with the level of expertise of the users, with the
belief system of the user or the organization, and so forth. We
agree with Kaplan that fit with work processes constitutes an
important explanation for success. However, we find that
whether ‘‘fit’’ exists or not is not due to the technology
introduced and the practice in which it is to be used. Rather,
this ‘‘fit’’ has to be actively produced: the technology and the
practice have to be made to fit. An information system has to
be adapted to the work practices of the user, but users will
have to change their practices as well because of the
opportunities and constraints of the technology. To achieve
this fit, first of all, requires a thorough understanding of the
work practices. Yet an analysis of work practices should not
only include an analysis of what people do, but also how they
might do it better.27 Often, a proper understanding of
a system’s functionality can point to the direction of such
improvements. In this case, for example, it was a moot point
that the hospital did not attempt to restructure work routines
so that an order entry system would be able to articulate with
the practice much better.6 An order entry system becomes
truly useful, even for doctors, when standardized care paths
and protocolized order sets are made part and parcel of
working routines. A deeper understanding of clerical work
practices, also, might have led to their reorganization and
perhaps could have prevented the increase in the number of
clerks. In the current example, because ‘‘organizational
change’’ was not planned, measures to remedy organizational
impacts were now mainly defensive. Alternatively, proper
information technology implementation should always be
seen as a process of organizational change and should thus
always be oriented toward a redesign of, in this case,
professional working patterns.28
Conclusion
In the case study of the implementation of a CPOE system in
a large university medical center, we have sought to further
our understanding of the process of information systems
implementation. We argue, first, that the introduction of the
order entry and results reporting system can be properly
understood only if we consider the social and technical
aspects of the story as highly interrelated. ‘‘Implementation’’
is not a purely ‘‘social’’ process, and it is not determined by or
reducible to ‘‘technical’’ issues. It is always and irreducibly
both. This makes the task complex for the analyst, because he
or she should be able to dive deeply in both the organiza-
tional dynamics and the technical details of an im-
plementation account. In addition, it points at the difficulty
of managing an implementation; there as well the challenge of
‘‘bridging’’ and integrating the organizational dynamics with
the technical (im)possibilities has to be met head on.29
We argue, furthermore, that the implementation process is
highly unpredictable. At the time of the decision to
implement the system, no one could have foreseen that later
experience with PC Windows technology would influence the
attitude of users. Despite the fact that the implementation of
the system has been ‘‘frozen,’’ continuous changes are made
to incorporate new requirements such as the coming of
a diagnosis-related group (DRG)-like financing scheme in
Dutch hospitals (Fig. 3). We saw that the implementation
process was influenced by contingencies that were not
expected and certainly not planned for. Some were small,
for example, the move of the gynecology order entry pilot
from the inpatient clinic to the ambulatory clinic. The ‘‘feel’’ of
an interface becoming obsolete and the changing position of
the medical staff were major changes that had major impact
on the acceptance of the system. Unanticipated and un-
planned changes are part and parcel of the implementation
process and can often manifest themselves in hindsight.
Emergent change is a key characteristic of implementing
information systems in complex organizations.
We conclude that there is no simple formula for success
because of the complexity of the sociotechnical networks and
the inherent unpredictability of information system im-
plementation within complex organizations such as the
university medical center. Failure of the implementation
could not be predicted at the beginning. However, it became
apparent that the information system did not fit well with
work practices. In our view, ‘‘fit’’ can be seen as a key factor
for the successful implementation of information systems.
However, fit is not a property that relates to the nature of
technology or work practices; it has to be actively produced.
Just analyzing work practices to discover how technology
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might be implemented is not sufficient. Both technology and
work practices have to be changed to implement an
information system successfully.
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